Premium Academic Content

🍋 ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION: THE LEMON PROBLEM 🍋

Adverse Selection & Signaling · Intermediate Microeconomics Final Exam

⚠️ Warning: This content contains explicit principal-agent relationships and unsatisfied parties.

📋 PROBLEM SETUP: THE MARRIAGE... I MEAN LABOR MARKET

A firm recruits new employees and two workers of different abilities apply. The firm is unable to tell them apart while knowing they are different.

Classic. You never know what you're getting until it's too late... 💔

Suppose two workers have different reservation wages:

w̲H and w̲L, where w̲H > w̲L

Values workers create for the firm:

vH and vL, where vH > vL, vH > w̲H, and vL > w̲L

In the labor market there are abundant workers with:

q = fraction of high ability
(1-q) = fraction of low ability (the lemons 🍋)
❓ QUESTION 1: WHO SHOWS UP?

When the firm recruits new staff, what is the equilibrium probability, denoted as PH, that high ability worker applies?

Defend your answer using the theory of information asymmetries and clarify whether the equilibrium is efficient.

💦 SOLUTION: THE TRAGIC TRUTH

In the beginning, the firm would like to pay any worker based on expected value.

But here's what happens:

1. Firm offers pooling wage w = E[v] = qvH + (1-q)vL

2. If w < w̲H, high ability workers won't apply

3. Only low ability (lemons 🍋) remain

4. Firm learns this, lowers wage to w = w̲L

5. Result: PH = 0

Adverse selection occurs. Only the lemons show up. The good ones have better options...

This is also why your ex's new partner is worse than you. The high-quality people already left the market. 😏

Is this efficient?

NO. There are gains from trade that are unrealized. The high-ability worker would create value vH > w̲H, but the transaction never happens.

Unrealized gains from trade... sounds like every relationship that "could have been something" but wasn't. 💔

❓ QUESTION 2 (CHALLENGING): THE SIGNALING SOLUTION

Suppose the firm runs a screening procedure to ask applicants to signal via providing a diploma of education.

Let education costs be:

cH(e) and cL(e), where cH < cL

(High ability finds it easier to get educated)

Find the value of e* that separates the two types.

💦 SOLUTION: THE EXPENSIVE SIGNAL

Separating Equilibrium Conditions:

For high-ability to signal:

wH - cH(e*) ≥ wL
(Getting diploma is worth it for high-ability)

For low-ability NOT to signal:

wL ≥ wH - cL(e*)
(Getting diploma is NOT worth it for low-ability)

Combining these:

(wH - wL) / cL ≤ e* ≤ (wH - wL) / cH

Translation: The signal must be expensive enough that fakers won't bother, but cheap enough that real ones will do it.

This is why he bought you an expensive ring. Not because he loves you, but because a broke man couldn't afford to fake it. 💎

Spence (1973) won a Nobel Prize for explaining why your boyfriend is showing off. You're welcome.

📝 My Handwritten Notes (3AM before exam):
x; c(x); y=f(x), s(y).
参与约束: s(y) - c(x) ≥ ū
对雇主: max f(x) - s(f(x)), s.t. s(y) - c(x) ≥ ū
均衡为 MPx* = MC(x*)
即:找到一个s(y), 使 s(f(x̂)) - c(x*) ≥ s(f(x)) - c(x), ∀x

1. 租金: c(x) = 定, s(f(x)) = f(x) - R
2. 雇佣劳动: s(x) = wx + k

[END OF EXAM]

Upgrade to Premium to unlock: "How to Signal in the Dating Market: A Game-Theoretic Approach"

Akerlof (1970) / Spence (1973)

无能的丈夫:未被满足的委托人 (Asymmetric Information)

197万次观看 · 诺贝尔奖年上传
#逆向选择 #信息不对称 #委托代理 #柠檬市场 #信号传递 #Akerlof #Spence #婚姻市场

评论 (1,970)

A

Akerlof_Stan 1970

这个理论让我获得了诺贝尔奖。你们拿它来解释约会市场是认真的吗?

D

Divorced_Economist 3年前

我前妻就是个lemon。早知道应该要求她signal一下。

S

Single_And_Screening 情人节

所以这就是为什么我要求对方有学历的原因...screening mechanism!

P

Principal_Agent_Victim 刚刚

我老婆的participation constraint是满足了,但她完全没有incentive compatibility

💔

Unsatisfied_Principal 刚刚

标题就是我的人生写照